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Abstract: This paper aims to provide a psychologically-informed philosophical account of the 
phenomenology of episodic remembering. The literature on epistemic or metacognitive feelings has 
grown considerably in recent years, and there are persuasive reasons, both conceptual and empirical, 
in favour of the view that the phenomenology of remembering—autonoetic consciousness, as Tulving 
influentially referred to it, or the feeling of pastness, as we will refer to it here—is an epistemic feeling, 
but few philosophical treatments of this phenomenology as an epistemic feeling have so far been 
proposed. Building on insights from the psychological literature, we argue that a form of feeling-based 
metacognition is involved in episodic remembering and develop an integrated metacognitive feeling-
based view that addresses several key aspects of the feeling of pastness, namely, its status as a feeling, 
its content, and its relationship to the first-order memories the phenomenology of which it provides. 
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1 Introduction 
 
There is a broad consensus, in both psychology and philosophy, that episodic remembering is 
characterized by a specific phenomenology. Tulving (e.g., 1985), the most influential 
proponent of this view in psychology, argued that what it is to episodically remember is to 
have a mental image of a past event accompanied by the consciousness—autonoesis, in his 
terms—of mentally travelling back to one’s original experience of that event. In episodic 
memory, one does not, in other words, merely know that the represented event occurred in 
one’s past; one in some sense relives it: to episodically remember is “to consciously re-
experience past experiences” (Tulving 2002a: 6). As Klein puts it, in a Tulvingian vein, if 
awareness of content is to amount to remembering, “the content in awareness must present 
itself as a reexperience of an experience previously had” (2015a: 6). From a philosophical 
point of view, the feature of episodic remembering that Tulving and Klein single out is its 
qualitative or phenomenal character—its what-it-is-likeness, to use an intuitive but vague 
expression present in the literature. It is the nature of this what-it-is-likeness that the present 
paper aims to describe and explain. Before proceeding, we note that there are three related 
issues with which the paper will not be concerned. First, though doubts have occasionally 
been voiced (e.g., by Hoerl 2019) regarding the very existence of a specific phenomenology 
of remembering, the paper will not respond to these doubts, taking the existence of this 
feature of remembering to be both intuitively plausible and empirically well-established. 
Second, it will not consider the question whether, in order for a mental state to qualify as an 
episodic memory, it must involve a specific phenomenology; that is, it will not argue that the 
latter is a necessary—and not merely a characteristic—feature of episodic remembering 
(compare Martin & Deutscher 1966 and Wheeler et al. 1997). Finally, the paper will not be 
concerned with the question whether the phenomenology of remembering is sufficient for 
episodic remembering: certain “continuist” (as opposed to discontinuist; see Perrin & 
Michaelian 2017; Michaelian et al. 2020) approaches to the relationship between episodic 
memory, on the one hand, and episodic future and counterfactual thought, on the other 
hand, have treated the latter as being characterized by a phenomenology that is, modulo its 
temporal orientation, identical to that of the former (e.g., Tulving 2002a; De Brigard 2014; 
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Michaelian 2016), but we will remain agnostic on this question here, contenting ourselves 
with giving an account of the phenomenology of episodic memory without considering its 
relationship to the phenomenologies of other forms of episodic thought. 
 This paper aims to provide a psychologically-informed philosophical account of the 
phenomenology of episodic remembering. The literature on epistemic or metacognitive 
feelings has grown considerably in recent years, and there are persuasive reasons, both 
conceptual and empirical, in favour of the view that the phenomenology of remembering—
the feeling of pastness (FOP), as we will refer to it here1—is an epistemic feeling, but few 
philosophical treatments of this phenomenology as an epistemic feeling have so far been 
proposed. Building on insights from the psychological literature, we argue that a form of 
feeling-based metacognition is involved in remembering and develop an integrated 
metacognitive feeling-based view that addresses several key aspects of the feeling of 
pastness, namely, its status as a feeling, its content, and its relationship to the first-order 
memories the phenomenology of which it provides. We proceed as follows. In section 2, we 
introduce the view on which the phenomenology of remembering is a feeling and that its 
content is not limited to pastness as such but also involves components pertaining to the self, 
causality, and singularity. In section 3, we discuss non-metacognitive accounts of the feeling 
phenomenology of remembering. Finding these to be unsatisfactory, we turn in section 4 to 
the only metacognitive feeling-based account of the FOP currently available, that proposed 
by Dokic (2014), but argue it faces a number of serious problems. Building on the critical 
discussion of Dokic’s proposal, we develop, in section 5, a new metacognitive feeling-based 
account. This account incorporates a moderate anti-separatist position regarding the 
relationship between the FOP and first-order memories, an inferentialist and embodied 
position regarding the phenomenal quality of the FOP, and a moderate conceptualist position 
regarding the content of the FOP, and thereby avoids the problems that beset Dokic’s 
account. 
 
2 Introducing the feeling view of episodic phenomenology 
 
In this section we introduce the view that the phenomenology of remembering is 
appropriately conceived of as a feeling in the first place, and ask which components the 
content of such a feeling includes. Once we will have secured these basic points of 
characterization, we can embark upon the search for the feeling account to prefer in the 
following sections. 
 
2.1 Is the phenomenology of remembering a feeling? 
 
Two main types of accounts are proposed in the existing literature about the phenomenology 
of episodic remembering. Some hold that it consists of a judgment or meta-comment made 
about the information conveyed by a first-order memory. On the so-called meta-
 
1 “Feeling of pastness” refers to the phenomenology of episodic recollection in a way that aligns nicely with our 
account because it emphasizes the feeling nature of the phenomenology of remembering and features the 
temporal information it conveys as its central component. Note that though James (1890/1983: 570, 612) and 
Russell (1921/1997: 163) famously use that expression, it should be clear that we have our own distinct 
definition of it. Also note that the specific components of FOP are discussed in section 2.2 and that the meaning 
of “feeling” is discussed in depth in sections 4 and 5.2. 
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representationalist stand2, what is represented by a first-order memory appears as past 
because a comment built into the content of this memory states it is so. Accounts of the latter 
sort have recently been proposed by Redshaw (2014) and Mahr and Csibra (2018). Redshaw 
refers to the phenomenology of remembering in terms of autonoesis and claims it requires 
the capacity to relate one’s memories to other aspects of reality by situating first-order 
episodic representations with respect to larger narrative structures. For instance, a subject’s 
first-order representation of his tenth birthday party will only involve autonoesis, on this 
account, if the subject is able to place it in a more general narrative of his past, that is, if he 
can locate this event in relation to other events experienced by him. The ability to undergo 
autonoesis is thus, if Redshaw is right, bound up with the ability to metarepresent 
relationships among different first-order episodic representations. In a broadly similar vein, 
Mahr and Csibra argue that memory serves a communicative function in that it enables the 
subject to establish himself as a reliable communicator, with autonoesis serving to flag the 
relationship between memories and past experiences, thereby enabling the subject to claim 
epistemic authority with respect to remembered events. For instance, if the subject wants to 
convince his friends that the mayor punched a citizen, it will be beneficial for him if his 
memory of that event is accompanied by a state signalling that the memory originates in his 
experience of the remembered event. The ability to undergo autonoesis is thus, if Mahr and 
Csibra are right, bound up with the ability to metapresent the relationship between present 
memories and past experiences. 
 Others are eager to describe the phenomenology of episodic remembering in terms of 
feeling and attempt to explain it by appealing to the informational content of the first-order 
memory representation itself. Fernández (2006, 2017), for instance, develops an account 
according to which the temporal phenomenology of episodic remembering consists of the 
feeling of pastness, which he defines as the feeling that what a memory represents occurred 
in the past. On his view, this phenomenology must be explained in terms of the experience of 
the content of the memory it accompanies. Specifically, we would undergo a feeling of 
pastness because the content of the memory says about itself that it causally derives from a 
personal experience. We will have more to say about this experience-of-content account in 
section 3. For now, we point out that regardless of their differences, these accounts all posit 
a strong dependence relation between the phenomenology of the episodic remembering and 
the content of the first-order memory whose phenomenology it is. On the meta-
representationalist account, the phenomenology is a judgment whose object is the content 
of the first-order memory, thus the content of the judgment includes the latter. On the 
experience-of-content account, the phenomenology is an experience whose object is the 
content of the first-order memory, thus the phenomenology is strongly determined by the 
content of the memory. While we will argue for an account of the phenomenology of episodic 
remembering in terms of feelings rather than in terms of metarepresentational judgments, 
we think that these feelings are largely not dependent on the content of the first-order 
memory (vs. the experience-of-content account) but produced metacognitively, as claimed 
by Dokic’ account in terms of feeling-based metacognition3. 
 
2 We use “meta-representational” in line with common usage in metacognition studies, which usually restrict 
this term to explicit and judgment-based metacognition. Thus, it should be clear that as we rebut meta-
representationalism about episodic phenomenology, we do not rebut the representational value of 
metacognitive feelings. Quite the contrary, our feeling-based account intends to make due right to the 
representational character of metacognition, though not in meta-representationalist terms. 
3 See sections 4.2 and 5.1 for arguments and details. 
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2.2 What are the components of the feeling? 
 
We will, in what follows, assume that the phenomenology of remembering consists of a 
feeling, whether or not it is properly classified as a metacognitive feeling. Now what is the 
content of this feeling? There are three obvious components that the content might include. 
First, it might inform the subject that the remembered event occurred in the past; call this 
the pastness component. Second, it might inform him that it occurred in his past—that he 
experienced it when it happened; call this the self component. And third, it might inform him 
that his current representation of the remembered event results from his past experience of 
it; call this the causation component. While there is no uncontroversial means of determining 
the content of a given phenomenal state, and while atypical cases have elicited and will 
certainly continue to elicit controversy, it is plausible that the phenomenology of 
remembering includes each of these three components. Our argument, however, does not 
require us to make the strong claim that each of the components is necessary for it;4 it is 
enough, for present purposes, to maintain that they are typical of that phenomenal state. 
Thus it may be, for all that we say here, that, in certain atypical cases, the phenomenology of 
remembering does not include all three components. This, in turn, has the consequence that, 
even if we grant that a specific phenomenology is necessary for the occurrence of genuine 
episodic remembering, there may be cases of genuine episodic remembering—this is what 
suggests the case of RB described by Klein and Nichols (2012)—in which, for example, the 
subject does not have the sense that the remembered event belongs to his past or that he 
experienced it when it occurred. 
 Why focus on these three components? The pastness component is uncontroversial. 
Though Tulving (2002b) does argue in places that the sense of time involved in episodic 
memory, chronesthesia, can be separated from the sense of self, autonoesis, he sees both 
chronesthesia and autonoesis as playing essential roles in remembering. In practice, 
moreover, the difference between the concept of autonoesis and that of chronesthesia is 
typically treated as being a matter of mere emphasis: as Szpunar puts it, “[t]he concept of 
‘chronesthesia’ emphasizes awareness of the subjective time in which one’s self exists”, 
whereas “[t]he concept of ‘autonoetic consciousness’ emphasizes awareness of one’s self 
existing in subjective time” (2011: 410). The self component is likewise basically 
uncontroversial. The central role of a sense of the self lies, for example, behind Tulving’s and 
Szpunar’s distinction between autonoesis and chronesthesia. And the case described by Klein 
and Nichols would be uninteresting were we not to take it that the phenomenology of 
remembering at least typically involves a sense of the self: the case of patient RB is 
provocative precisely because it seems to be one in which every other characteristic that we 
ordinarily attribute to episodic memory—both at the level of content (RB’s representations 
of past events include detailed sensory information about particular events) and at the level 
of phenomenology (he is aware that the events happened in the past and that his current 
representations of them are caused by his past experience of them)—but lacks the sense that 
 
4 Nor do we claim that they are sufficient for the phenomenology of remembering—indeed, we suggest below 
that it includes a fourth component. As one of the anonymous reviewers rightly pointed it out to us, another 
potential component is actuality (see Mahr, 2020, for this view). Again, we only claim that our list is made of 
typical components. Note however that the feeling of pastness together with its causal, singular, and self-
referential components can occur without the component of actuality, as when an episodic memory is not 
believed by the remembering subject (Mazzoni et al., 2010). 
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the events that he remembers belong to him. While Klein and Nichols’ description of this 
particular case has been contested by some (Roache 2016; see Klein 2016 for a reply), others 
(Fernández 2019) have taken it as the basis for arguments for the involvement of a feeling of 
ownership in episodic memory, and this general claim is plausible regardless of what we make 
of the case of RB in particular. 
 The causality component may be more controversial. We point out, however, that the 
involvement in the phenomenology of remembering of a sense that one’s present 
representation causally originates in one’s past experience of the represented event would 
account for the enduring popularity of the causal theory of memory (Martin & Deutscher 
1966; Bernecker 2010; Michaelian & Robins 2018). Consider the example offered by Dokic 
(2014) of his memory of flying on the Concorde as a young child, a memory which, he tells us, 
traces back, not to his experience of flying on the Concorde, but rather to his parents’ telling 
him about his flying on the Concorde several years after the event. The intuition that such 
memories are in an important sense defective—that they are, as philosophers sometimes say, 
merely apparent, as opposed to genuine—is plausibly accounted for by the fact that, when 
one remembers, one has the sense that one’s memory is due to one’s experience of the 
remembered event. Thus even Fernández (2019), who rejects the causal theory, builds a 
representation of a causal link between the present representation and the past experience 
into the content of the memory in an attempt to account for the phenomenology of 
remembering. Similarly, Mahr and Csibra (2018, 2020), we have seen, argue that memory is 
able to perform its communicative function because its phenomenology indicates to the 
rememberer the existence of a causal relationship between his memory and his experience 
of the corresponding event—episodic memory is able to serve as a “witness trump card” 
(Henry & Craver 2018) because its phenomenology includes causality (“I remember this 
because I saw it happen”), as opposed to mere actuality (“This happened”). Accordingly, we 
will take it for granted, in what follows, that the phenomenology of remembering includes 
the causation component, as well as the pastness and self components. 
 In addition to these three components, the inclusion of which in the phenomenology of 
remembering is relatively widely recognized, phenomenology includes, we want to suggest, 
a fourth component: singularity (Perrin, 2019; Sant’Anna, 2020)5.  In line with the literature 
on singular thought (Jeshion 2010), by singularity we mean a quantity feature. As far as 
episodic memory is concerned, it characterizes the particularity of experienced and 
remembered events that are represented by the memories, for instance such or such 
particular event of going to the university on a specific day (e.g. the time I meet an old friend 
on the tram as I was heading towards the university), in contrast with the iterative event of 
doing so. On standard accounts of the content of episodic memories, they typically represent 
singular events in this sense. So, it seems important to include singularity among the 
components of the content of episodic memory. The content of many episodic memories is 
formed of an imagistic content plus a certain phenomenology. Now imagistic contents do not 
include by themselves any quantificational feature of the represented event. Our suggestion 
is that the singularity feature of remembered events can be conveyed by phenomenology. 
 
5 Whether singularity is a feature of episodic remembering, as the vast majority of studies assume it, is in fact a 
matter of debate. It is not sure that strong singularism about episodic memory – namely the claim that for a 
mental state to qualify as an episodic memory, it has to be about a particular/singular event – is the view to 
prefer. It is not even sure that weak singularism – namely the claim that for a mental state to qualify as an 
episodic memory, it is typically about a particular/singular event – is correct (on this, see Andonovski, 2020). We 
do not want to pursue this issue here. 
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One could object that it is an additional semantic information that fulfills this role. But we 
experience episodic memories in which the represented event appears as having occurred at 
a singular moment of our past experience while no semantic information is accessible 
regarding this quantificational feature and we are unable to assign a specific spatio-temporal 
address. Thus, our proposal is that the information that the remembered content is singular 
can be conveyed by phenomenology and is one of its typical components. We will elaborate 
on this in section 5. If the phenomenology of remembering includes these four components—
pastness, self, causality, and singularity—how, exactly, are they related to each other? We 
take this question up in the section 5.3. 
 
3 Feeling-phenomenology without metacognition 
 
In the previous section, we introduced an approach to the phenomenology of remembering 
as a feeling and we detailed its typical components. The question that now confronts us is 
whether the mechanism that gives rise to this phenomenology is metacognitive in nature or 
not. In this section, we review and reject two views—defended, respectively, by Klein and 
Fernández—that attempt to account for the phenomenology of remembering in terms of 
feelings but without invoking underlying metacognitive mechanisms6. Such views turning out 
to be inadequate, we will consider the metacognitive feeling-based approach in the following 
section. 
 
3.1 The structural approach 
 
On the Tulving-inspired (Tulving 1985; Wheeler et al. 1997: 350) approach to episodic 
memory defended by Klein, for a mental state that is causally connected to past experience 
to qualify as an episodic memory it is necessary and sufficient that it be accompanied by 
autonoetic consciousness, where autonoesis is understood as a feeling. Klein speaks, for 
instance, of a “subjective feeling of pastness” (2015a: 5), i.e., of a phenomenal character of 
remembering that is distinct from, but associated with the content of retrieved memories: 
“‘there is something it is like’ for a mental state to be experienced as an act of remembering” 
(2015a: 1). Autonoetic consciousness, on Klein’s view, “is a direct, non-inferential feeling given 
to awareness” (2015a: 8, emphasis added) and includes the four components identified in 
section 3: contrasting autonoetic consciousness with the noetic consciousness involved in 
semantic remembering, for example, Klein argues that “noetic consciousness does not 
provide its owner with a subjective feeling that she or he is mentally traveling back in time 
[pastness] to the events and experiences [singularity] that gave birth to [causality] the content 
in awareness. … [T]he feeling of subjective time travel [self] is intrinsic to autonoesis” (2015b: 
5). 
 While we are in agreement with Klein regarding the components of autonoesis, we find his 
account to be problematic in other respects. Borrowing a term from Whittlesea (2003: 241), 
Klein’s approach proposes a “structural account” insofar as “it assumes that each qualitatively 
different aspect of performance is supported by a different module of memory”. In other 
words, Klein conceives of autonoetic consciousness as a distinct and autonomous structural 
component of the mind rather than as the outcome of the working of a certain mechanism. 
This approach is inadequate in two respects. First, it has nothing to say about how the 
 
6 Matthen (2010) and Michaelian (2016), too, endorse non-metacognitive feeling accounts. 
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components of the content of autonoesis relate to each other. Second, it dispenses with 
providing an account of the processes that bring about autonoetic consciousness while there 
are serious potential candidates to this role. Klein thus suggests that autonoesis is a self-
contained and ready-made element of the cognitive system, which rules out accounts that 
see it as depending on other elements of the system, e.g., on the contents of memories or on 
the detection and interpretation of features of the processing that produces them. Overall, 
the account is unsatisfactory in that, first, it builds a good deal of conceptual richness—
pastness, self, causality, singularity—into autonoesis without explaining how something that 
has the nature of a feeling is capable of having such a conceptually rich content; and second, 
in that it excludes the possibility that autonoesis be generated by certain mechanisms in the 
cognitive system, and subsequently does not really propose an account of autonoesis. 
 
3.2 The experience-of-content approach 
 
Unlike Klein, Fernández does propose an explanation of the basis of the phenomenology of 
episodic recollection. He appeals to an intentionalist approach, according to which the 
phenomenology of a mental state is accounted for in terms of its representational content 
(Tye, 1997, 2002; Dretske, 1997; Byrne, 2001). His specific intentionalist explanation appeals 
to the contents of retrieved memories rather than on metacognitive monitoring of the 
processing that produces them: “the content of a memory is responsible for the way in which 
the memory feels to the subject” (2019: 29). Fernández’ hypothesis is, more precisely, that 
the phenomenology of remembering is the experience of the content of the memory: “the 
temporal phenomenology of memory is the way in which we experience some of the things 
that we represent in memory” (2019: 24). 
 Fernández argues for a self-referential view of memory content, according to which the 
content of a memory represents the fact that it (the memory) causally originates in the 
remembering subject’s earlier experience of the remembered event (2019: 79). In other 
words, not only the remembered event and the rememberer’s original experience of it but 
also the notion of a causal relation between the memory and the experience is built into the 
content of the memory. As he sees things, this explains the occurrence of the pastness 
component of the content of autonoesis, or what Fernández refers to as “PAST”: awareness 
of the remembered fact7 “as obtaining in the past” (2019: 87).8 On his view, PAST is the 
subject’s experience of the causal component of the content of an episodic memory (2019: 
108): because it is intrinsic to the notion of causality that causes precede their effects, when 
one is aware of the causality component of a memory one is thereby aware that the 
remembered event is located in the past; experience of the causality component of the 
memory gives rise to the pastness component of the associated phenomenology (2019: 108-
109). 
 We have three objections to this experience-of-content account. The first is that it is in 
conflict with Fernandez’ overall first-order representationalist account. The idea that content 
is experienced and then becomes conscious sounds more like a higher-order theory, such as 
 
7 Fernández treats episodic memory as being propositional in character, but this feature of his approach will play 
no role in our assessment of it. 
8 Fernández distinguishes two components in the temporal phenomenology of remembering: the awareness of 
an objective fact as obtaining in the past and the awareness of what it was like to perceptually experience that 
fact (APE) (2019: 87). Since he offers the same intentionalist account of both components, we will, for the sake 
of simplicity, consider only PAST in what follows. 
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the ones proposed by Lycan (1996) and Rosenthal (1997), who reject first-order 
representationalism (e.g., Tye's and Dretske's views). The second concerns the phrase 
“experience of some of the things that we represent in memory”. In practice, Fernández has 
little to say here. If this notion cannot be successfully unpacked, an analysis—such as that 
proposed in the following section—that succeeds in explaining the occurrence of PAST by 
providing an empirically-grounded description of the mechanism underlying PAST should be 
preferred. Even if it can be unpacked, there are concerns about the very notion of an 
experience of the component of a content. In what, precisely, does such an experience 
consist? We see two possible answers to this question: the experience might be a matter of 
introspection, or it might be a matter of understanding. Each of these is problematic. 
 Consider the first option. We might define the relevant notion of experience in terms of 
introspection, but three problems would then arise. First, if the object of the subject’s 
introspection is the causality component, then the feeling experienced by the subject as he 
introspects the causality component should concern causality in addition to pastness. 
Actually, however, Fernández’ account of PAST leaves no room for consciousness of the 
causality component. Second, this definition does not explain why introspection of the 
causality component should trigger a feeling rather than, say, a belief about the temporal 
location of the remembered fact. In other words, the affective, phenomenal character of PAST 
is not explained. Finally, it is not clear that something as abstract as the causality component 
might be the object of introspection—in order to grasp such an entity, understanding would 
seem to be required. 
 Consider, then, the second option. We might define the relevant notion of experience in 
terms of understanding. Fernández’ analysis of intentional content in terms of propositional 
content suggests this definition, and some neo-Russellian researchers maintain that some of 
the components of the propositional contents of singular thoughts or sentences are the relata 
of an experiential relation of acquaintance (Jeshion 2010). Understanding thoughts of this 
kind would imply being acquainted with some of the components of their content. But while 
the idea of an acquaintance relation with a concrete entity is relatively plausible, the idea of 
such a relation with an abstract entity—such as a causal relation—is obscure at best. In short, 
there seems to be no satisfactory definition of the experience of a component of content, as 
it figures in Fernández’ account. 
 Our third objection requires to introduce some empirical findings that will be pivotal for 
our argument9. There is a great deal of research demonstrating that feelings such as PAST are 
sensitive to features of the processing that produces mental states, rather than to the content 
of those states (Whittlesea 1997: 219; Dokic 2012: 310; Koriat 2007: 298). Experiments show 
that, depending on the questions asked to subjects, one and the same experimental device 
can trigger PAST as well as (for instance) a feeling of pleasantness. In Whittlesea (1993: 1244-
1246 – see also Whittlesea 1997: 246-247), subjects were presented with a list of words in a 
study phase. In the test phase, they were asked whether the items presented were neutral or 
pleasant before being asked whether they had been presented with them (“old”) or not 
(“new”). As it turned out, words presented in the study phase were judged more pleasant 
than the others, just as they were judged old more often than the others10. These similar 
 
9 In this section we present these findings to show that they render Fernandez’s strong anti-separatism 
implausible. They will also be pivotal to show that Dokic’ separatism is implausible (section 4.2) and that our 
moderate anti-separatism should be preferred (section 5.1). 
10 “Turning to the relationship between pleasantness and recognition ratings, it is clear that they were influenced 
by the same factors, and to about the same degree” (1993: 1246). 
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patterns of results strongly suggest that the output of the detection of one and the same 
perceptual fluency feature11 due to prior presentation can produce a feeling of pleasantness 
as well as a PAST feeling, depending on the questions asked to the subjects. Now—so our 
argument goes—these findings strongly threaten Fernández’ analysis. If the occurrence of 
PAST were sensitive to the content of a memory, Fernández could account in either of two 
ways for the above results, none of which is satisfactory. Either he could say that the feeling 
of pleasantness, too, results from the experience of a self-referential causal content. But one 
would hardly see why pleasantness could be the result of such an experience. Or he could say 
that two distinct mechanisms are in play as feelings of pleasantness occur and as PAST feelings 
occur, the former being grounded on fluency-detection while the latter is an experience of 
the causal self-referential content, but that despite their difference they produce the same 
patterns of results for the same items. Though not impossible, this option is much more 
complex and as far as we know not empirically supported. The metacognitive solution 
suggested above in terms of the detection and interpretation of procedural features thus 
recommends itself as more plausible than an explanation of PAST in terms of content-
sensitivity. However, though Fernandez’ content-based account turns out unsatisfactory, our 
account claims the plausibility and the sufficiency of the metacognitive approach, and we do 
not exclude in principle that content could play a role in episodic phenomenology. But 
arguments for this possibility are still to be provided. In total, therefore, neither of the 
accounts in terms of non-metacognitive feelings considered reveals satisfactory, and a 
metacognitive account promises to be more adequate. So, let’s explore this option. 
 
4 Dokic’s metacognitive feeling-based account 
 
In this section, we promote the view in cognitive psychology on which episodic recollection 
involves epistemic feelings. That provides a good reason to explore as a serious option a 
feeling-based account of the phenomenology of remembering such as the one favoured by 
Dokic, which we proceed to put under discussion. 
 
4.1 The metacognitive stand about the phenomenology of remembering 
 
We will argue that the phenomenology of remembering results from metacognitive 
monitoring. Let us make this claim more precise. We build on views (Koriat & Levy Sandot 
1999; Proust 2007; De Sousa 2009; Arango-Muñoz 2011), themselves inspired by the dual 
processing framework (Evans & Stanovich 2013), that acknowledge the existence of two 
distinct forms of metacognition. On the one hand, metacognition sometimes takes the form 
of explicit, controlled, slow, conceptually articulated processing—type 2 processing, in 
short—that involves the application of a theory of mind (for which reason it is often seen as 
being metarepresentational) and consists of conscious (or: personal) processes and outputs12. 
On the other hand, metacognition sometimes takes the form of implicit, automatic, fast, and 
conceptually poor processing—type 1 processing—that may (but does not necessarily) 
 
11 Because fluency-detection is considered as a chief heuristic in the literature on remembering, we will focus 
on it throughout the paper. But there are other procedural features (like the ease of generation of further 
contextual details, for instance) that can play the same role. On this, see Whittlesea and Leboe (2000) and 
Whittlesea (1997: 219). 
12 We use “conscious” and “personal” equivalently, and refer thereby to “consciousness” in a wide sense that 
cover both its phenomenal and intentional features. 
 10 
produce conscious outputs. Type 1 metacognition relies on heuristics that enable the mind to 
carry out cognitive operations more rapidly and economically than type 2 metacognition. For 
instance, if one has to answer a question that taps into one’s knowledge in geography but is 
unable to do so straightaway, one might decide to keep searching for the answer rather than 
giving up either because one explicitly remembers that one has studied the relevant material 
and therefore consciously infers that one should be able to retrieve the answer given 
sufficient effort, or because one has a gut feeling (the source of which, of course, eventually 
needs to be explained) that one will be able to retrieve the answer to the question. 
 The dual processing framework has been applied to memory in a similar way. On the 
standard application of this framework (see Yonelinas, 2002 for a review), recognition 
memory can take either of two forms13. Consider a standard recognition task in which a study 
phase during which subjects are presented with a list of words is followed by a test phase 
during which they have to decide whether items are “old” or “new”. Subjects may, a 
proponent of the dual processing approach argues, draw either on a feeling of familiarity or 
on explicit recollection in order to make this decision. The former strategy involves the 
application of a heuristic, while the latter relies on a detailed and explicit mental articulation 
of the context in which a given item was originally seen. This view thus takes episodic 
remembering—i.e., recollection (Yonelinas 2002: 446, see also 2001)—to tap into type 2 
metacognition only, taking feeling-based or type 1 metacognition to be involved exclusively 
in the production of the feeling of familiarity. No characteristic metacognitive feelings due to 
recollective processes, like the feeling of pastness, would be involved in remembering, 
therefore.14 
 While this approach has been influential, dissenting voices have emerged, in the form of a 
family of models on which recollection, too, involves type 1 metacognition. Whittlesea (1997, 
2003; Leboe & Whittlesea 2002, 2013), in particular (see also Kurilla & Westerman 2008), has 
persuasively argued that the phenomenology of episodic recollection results from implicit 
detection and interpretation of possibly unconscious (or: subpersonal) cues15. Similar claims 
have been made by other researchers focused on metacognition, including Koriat (2007: 314; 
see also Nelson and Narens 1990), or memory, including Jacoby and Kelley (Jacoby et al. 1989; 
Kelley & Jacoby 1990; see also Ansons & Leboe 2011: 70), with the latter developing an 
attributionalist approach according to which the subjective experience of remembering is the 
result at the personal level of a subpersonal process of attribution to the past of detected 
procedural features like fluency.16 In line with these models, we will defend a view of the 
phenomenology of remembering that sees it as arising specifically from type 1 metacognitive 
 
13 On its technical use in the mentioned experimentalist literature, the expression “recognition memory” refers 
to the mental states that prompts subjects to give an “old” response as they have to decide whether or not they 
have already been presented with an item. In addition to recollection in recognition memory, the literature 
distinguishes free recollection (or: free recall). But since the same analysis is proposed of the latter as of 
recollection as it is involved in recognition memory, considering this form of memory will suffice. 
14 Note that the strong difference of nature posited by the standard dual processing approach between 
familiarity and recollection does not imply that it would exclude any functional relationship between them. For 
instance, some consider that an occurrence of familiarity triggers the search for contextual information through 
the recollection of specifics (Hintzman & Curran, 1994; Koriat & Levy-Sandot, 2001). Thanks to an anonymous 
reviewer for prompting this clarification. Also note that we do not exclude that a feeling of familiarity overlaps 
with recollection. What we contest is that this is a feeling due to recollective process, on the one hand, and on 
the other hand, that familiarity provides remembering with its characteristic phenomenology. 
15 “(…) very little attention has been paid to (…) the ways in which attributional processes may contribute to a 
subjective sense of recollection in recognition memory.” (Kurilla & Westerman, 2011: 80) 
16 Whittlesea himself recognizes the similarity of his view to attributionalism (1997: 213). 
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monitoring, but we will go beyond, in particular in arguing that it consists of a specific feeling 
– the feeling of pastness – distinct from the feeling of familiarity. 
 
4.2 Dokic’s account 
 
Only one philosopher—Dokic (2014)—has previously argued for a similar approach in any 
detail. On Dokic’s “two-tiered” account, remembering involves the production of both a first-
order memory (the first tier, e.g. the imagistic representation of a scene that involves a 
birthday cake on a table surrounded by a bunch of people) and an associated feeling (the 
second tier, e.g. the feeling that this scene is an experience that I had in my personal past and 
from which my current image derives). The feeling in question is the result, at the personal 
level, of a cue detection and interpretation process occurring at the subpersonal level. Dokic 
sees these cues as being procedural in nature and thus treats the production of the feeling as 
being sensitive not to the content of the first-order memory but rather to features of the 
process that produces it (2012: 309; for similar claims, see Whittlesea 1997: 219; Koriat 2007: 
298). This feeling, in turn, has its own content, that is the information it conveys. It is, Dokic 
argues, to the effect that the scene represented by the memory is presented as having 
occurred in the past experience of the remembering subject. Moreover, this content is, in 
Dokic’s view, different from the content the feeling initially possesses as a bodily feeling, for 
instance the procedural fluency. It is acquired through association due to regular co-
occurrence. Feelings, such as the feeling of fluency, are indeed, in the first instance, conscious 
bodily conditions consisting in diffuse affective states (2012: 307). For instance, one can feel 
that reading a certain list of words is an easier task to carry out than reading another list, or 
that the answer to a certain question comes up in an easier way to one’s mind than the 
answer to another one. The occurrence of these conditions may covary with the occurrence 
of mental states, such as memory. Feelings of a certain type may thus become signs of states 
of a certain type, thereby acquiring a new content. Dokic maintains, in particular, that the 
feeling of fluency acquires the content that the represented event took place in the past due 
to its cooccurrence and consequent association with the state of episodic memory (2012: 
308-9; 2014: 9-10)17. 
 This feeling belongs, Dokic argues, to the general category of epistemic feelings; more 
specifically, it belongs to the category of feelings of knowing. Epistemic feelings are 
metacognitive feelings with contents concerning the achievements and capacities of the 
subject’s cognitive system. The feeling of certainty, for example, might amount to a positive 
assessment of the answer that one has given to a question. The feeling of knowing (FOK) is 
the feeling that one has the ability to provide the correct answer to a certain epistemic task. 
It thus grounds a positive assessment of the subject about her own epistemic capacities 
relative to the task she has to carry out. For example, as one is asked to provide the name of 
the capital city of a certain country, one can feel that one is able to retrieve the name in 
question before one has actually managed to retrieve it. This much is standard. Dokic’s key 
move is to suggest that the FOK may occur not only before one has retrieved an item but also 
while the item is being retrieved and to characterize the phenomenology of episodic 
remembering as an episodic feeling of knowing (EFOK). If we understand him correctly, the 
notion is that as one is remembering, one feels that one's mental state is epistemically well-
 
17 As suggested by Dokic (2012), this high availability of non-sensory bodily affection to acquire various contents 
different from their original bodily content is one of their interesting differences with respect to both emotional 
and sensory bodily affections. We do not pursue this point here. 
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grounded to the effect that one's mental states derives in an appropriate way from one of 
one's past experiences. In brief, one feels that one's state is a state of episodic knowing. 
 There is much to like in Dokic’s account, and, in what follows, we will take three of his 
general claims on board. First, we grant that autonoetic phenomenology is a metacognitive 
feeling resulting from the subpersonal detection of certain cues by monitoring of the process 
that produces the first-order memories that it accompanies. Second, we agree with Dokic that 
the content of this pastness-related phenomenology is acquired. Finally, we accept his claim 
that epistemic feelings are bodily in nature. Our endorsement of these general claims 
notwithstanding, there are several major difficulties for the specific metacognitive feeling-
based account in which Dokic embeds them. 
 First, while we agree with Dokic that features of the processing that produces memories 
contribute to the production of epistemic feelings and that the detection of these features is 
to an important extent content-insensitive, we disagree with his stronger claim that detection 
is entirely insensitive to content. The empirical results provided by Whittlesea’s experiments 
presented above demonstrate that the interpretation of the cues that trigger epistemic 
feelings is sensitive to the mental type (mnemonic, perceptual, etc.) that the context of 
processing of a first-order mental state attributes to the latter. Depending on the type of 
cognitive task a subject is required to carry out, he is likely to interpret one and the same cue 
differently, thus to experience different epistemic feelings. Now—so is our argument—since 
the mental type contributes to the content—for instance, if something is remembered rather 
than perceived, it is built into the content that the represented fact took place in the past—
and since epistemic feelings are sensitive to the mental type, then one cannot say (pace Dokic) 
that epistemic feelings are insensitive to content.  Second, we agree with Dokic on the bodily 
nature of feelings, that is: they are diffuse affective states and as such include a conscious 
sensory component that is about a certain bodily state (see section 5.2). But we disagree with 
the claim that one can simply say that the initial bodily and the acquired contents of epistemic 
feelings occur at the personal level. There are robust empirical results demonstrating that the 
acquired content of feelings has to be substituted for the bodily states that feelings are about 
in order for feelings to play the role they play (Schacter & Singer 1962; Whittlesea et al., 1990; 
Whittlesea 1997; Koriat 2007: 314; Jacoby & Whitehouse 1989; see also Roediger & 
McDermott 1995; Yonelinas, 2002: 464; Arango-Munoz, 2011: 75). For instance, if fluency is 
made salient to a subject as the bodily content of his feeling of remembering, this feeling 
thereby ceases to be experienced as a feeling of remembering. Again, depending on the 
context of processing of a stimulus, that is the cognitive task the subjects carry out, the 
content of a feeling can be the bodily content (e.g. fluency), the pastness acquired content or 
a pleasantness content. Third, while we grant that the content of epistemic feelings is 
acquired, we deny that this fact should be described in terms of “co-occurrence”, “stable 
association” (Dokic 2012: 308, 309), or cooccurrence “in normal context” with first-order 
episodic memory (Dokic 2014: 10)18. Co-occurrence may explain why the feeling of pastness 
is associated with the represented scene, but it does not explain why pastness appears to the 
subject as a feature of the remembered scene—why it appears to be attributed to (or: 
predicated of) it. Finally, and most importantly, we argue that it is, at best, misleading to refer 
to autonoetic consciousness as an EFOK. Dokic borrows the notion of EFOK from the 
psychological literature. But we do not think he does full justice to the specific content given 
by that literature to the notion. Consider the view of the EFOK proposed by Souchay et al. 
 
18 Arango-Munoz holds a similar view as he says that metacognitive feelings “are embodied signals that have 
been recruited to represent internal processes.” (2018: 2) 
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(2007; see also Souchay 2007 and Souchay & Moulin 2009) and invoked by Dokic himself. 
Building on the model defended by Koriat (1993), on which what triggers the FOK with respect 
to a given item of information is brief and partial access to that information, Souchay et al. 
argue that this model applies to the EFOK, in particular, and that the partial information in 
question is then made of “the contextual information, feelings, and self-awareness captured 
in Tulving’s concept of autonoetic consciousness or the state of ‘remembering” (2007: 771). 
They argue therefore that the EFOK occurs when autonoetic consciousness in particular is 
partially accessed. If this view is right, then the EFOK cannot be identified with autonoetic 
consciousness simply because the former results from detection of the latter. 
 In light of this final point, we suggest that Dokic has failed to take into account a distinction 
between two kinds of epistemic feelings. On the one hand, there are feelings that concern 
the capacities of the cognitive system. The FOK and, for example, the tip-of-the-tongue state 
exemplify this kind, insofar as they tell the subject something about the mental states that 
his cognitive system is capable of producing. Note that the item of information to which a 
given instance of one of these feelings pertains is opaque to the subject, in the sense that the 
feeling informs him that he is capable of accessing the item before he has actually done so. 
On the other hand, there are feelings that concern the achievements of the cognitive system. 
The feeling of certainty and the feeling of familiarity exemplify this kind, insofar as they tell 
the subject something about the mental states that his cognitive system has already 
produced. The item of information to which a given instance of one of these feelings pertains 
is transparent to the subject, in the sense that the feeling informs him that he has successfully 
accessed the needed item. What Dokic misleadingly refers to as the “episodic feeling of 
knowing” belongs to the latter category, simply because it tells the subject something about 
a representation that has already been produced, namely, that it causally derives from the 
subject’s past experience of the represented event, while the FOK (EFOK included) belongs to 
the category of feelings relative to cognitive capacities. We emphasize that the fact that the 
FOK occurs before rather than while or after the relevant item is accessed (see Paynter et al. 
2009) is not a contingent detail. It is precisely because the cognitive system has not yet 
accessed a given item that the subject needs to know whether it is worthwhile to continue to 
search for it; as the system succeeds in accessing the item, such knowledge becomes 
pointless. The motivational role of the FOK reinforces this point: as is widely acknowledged 
(De Sousa 2009: 152; Whittlesea, 1997: 220), a core role of the FOK is to prompt the subject 
to continue to search for an item information, and this role, of course, cannot be played after 
the item has been accessed. 
 To sum up, we note that, if our critical discussion of Dokic is on the right track, then a 
satisfactory feeling-based account of episodic phenomenology will need to take the following 
points into account. First, the episodic phenomenology is an achievement-related epistemic 
feeling that differs from the FOK. Second, while the episodic phenomenology results from 
sensitivity to features of processing, it also displays a certain sensitivity to content. Third, the 
bodily conditions the detection of which triggers the episodic phenomenology have to be 
superseded by the acquired content in order for them to play their role. Fourth, the 
“pastness” involved in the episodic phenomenology is predicated of the represented scene, 
not merely associated with it. The metacognitive feeling-based account proposed in section 
5 secures these four points. 
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5 A new metacognitive feeling-based account 
 
In this section, though Dokic’s account has proven to be unsatisfactory, we elaborate on its 
metacognitive two-tiered model of episodic remembering to promote a new metacognitive 
account. We argue that the phenomenology of remembering consists of a metacognitive 
feeling of pastness (FOP). To do so, we first tackle the issue of the relationship of a FOP to the 
memory with which it is associated; we then focus on the FOP itself, considering, in turn, its 
phenomenality and its content. 
 
5.1 The relation of the FOP to first-order episodic memory: Moderate anti-separatism 
 
The first issue is the relationship of a FOP to the first-order memory that it accompanies. 
Provided that the latter has a certain content, typically a represented scene, and that the FOP 
endows it with its phenomenology, what is the relationship between the content of the 
memory and the phenomenology, in particular the content of the accompanying feeling? Is 
the content of the feeling that the represented scene occurred in my past dependent on the 
content of the image that represents the scene, or is the former independent from the latter? 
And if the content of the memory and its phenomenology are linked by a dependence 
relation, in which direction does the relation run? Borrowing terms from Horgan and Tierson 
(2002) applied by Fernández (2017) to memory, we favour moderate anti-separatism, i.e., we 
claim that the intentional and phenomenological aspects are not completely separate. Let us 
explain. As our critical discussion of the approach in terms of non-metacognitive feelings is 
meant to show, the phenomenology of remembering is not sensitive to the contents of 
particular retrieved memories but rather to features of the processes that produce the latter. 
For this reason, we cannot endorse strong anti-separatism. But then why endorse anti-
separatism at all, rather than endorsing separatism, as Dokic (2012) does? In our view, there 
are two dependence relations between content and phenomenology that prevent us from 
adopting separatism and suggest, instead, a qualified, moderate anti-separatist view: the FOP 
depends on the mental type of the content of the first-order memory and the content of the 
complete memory depends on the FOP. 
 In order to describe the first of these relations, it is necessary to emphasize there are 
actually two kinds of sensitivity to content. On the one hand, sensitivity can be to the 
components of the content and their articulation. For instance, on Fernández’ (2019) view of 
episodic memory content, the FOP derives from sensitivity to the causal component of the 
content. We have rejected this token-content sensitivity. But there may also be sensitivity to 
the mental type —e.g., perceptual, imaginary, or mnemonic type – of the content19. Now, the 
feeling-based metacognitive framework in psychology presented above provides empirical 
evidence that strongly support the existence of this second kind of sensitivity20. The lesson 
we draw from such experiments is that it is the context in which processing occurs that 
 
19 One could also elaborate on this second kind of sensitivity in terms of a sensitivity to the cognitive mode under 
which the content of the first-order mental state is conscious. The resulting account, however, would be slightly 
different from the one favoured here. 
20 See 3.2 and 4.2. By way of a further empirical instance: in a series of experiments, Whittlesea and Leboe (2000) 
show that the occurrence of the same cues (fluency, generation, and resemblance) is recruited to perform 
cognitive operations as different as identifying a stimulus and remembering a previous experience of a stimulus. 
Depending on the questions posed to subjects, the detected cues will be interpreted differently; that is, 
depending on the mental type determined by the context in which the subject is prompted to process a content, 
he will experience a feeling of familiarity or a feeling of a successful identification (2000: 99). 
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determines how the features of the processing (e.g., fluency) that are detected by 
metacognitive monitoring are interpreted. We thus endorse a contextualist view on which 
the type assigned by the context of processing to the first-order content processed 
determines the type of feeling liable to occur in this context, thus the own content of the 
feeling. As we saw in section 4, Dokic is also in favour of the idea that epistemic feelings 
possess their content contingently. Our contextualist view, on which one and the same 
detected cue can trigger feelings with different contents, is somewhat similar to Dokic’s view. 
But whereas Dokic seems to favour the notion of a long-term contingency—since, on his view, 
it is a regular cooccurrence of certain feelings and certain mental states that makes the former 
represent the latter (2012: 308)—our contextualism favours short-term contingency instead, 
maintaining that each particular context determines the content of the occurrent feeling21. 
To sum up, a first component of our anti-separatism is that the content of the FOP depends 
on the mnemonic type that the context of processing attributes to the content of the first-
order mental state to which FOP is associated. 
 The second dependence relation goes in the other direction: the content of the episodic 
memory depends on the FOP. We argue below for the intentionalist view that (at least some 
of) the phenomenal components of a mental state have content (Arango-Muñoz 2014; Crane 
2001). On this view, as far as the FOP is concerned, its content contributes to the content of 
an episodic memory – the complete memory – by meshing with the content of the first-order 
memory that it accompanies. It is, we suggest, necessary to distinguish indeed between the 
content of a first-order memory—typically a scene—and the content of the complete 
memory, which includes the information that the represented scene has been experienced 
by the remembering subject at some moment of her past life, with at retrieval the content of 
the FOP being incorporated into the content of the complete memory. Overall, the type of 
the processed mental state determines the type of feeling liable to be triggered by it, and 
conversely, the feeling so triggered contributes to the content of the mental state whose 
processing triggered it in the first place. Our own anti-separatism thus combines moderate 
sensitivity of phenomenology to the content processed with dependence of the content of 
the complete memory on its phenomenology. 
 
5.2 The phenomenality of the FOP: Accommodating the inferentialist and the embodied 
views 
 
Let us now focus on the FOP itself, beginning with its phenomenality. How to account for the 
“feeling” nature of the FOP? As far as we can see, two main options are available: the 
inferentialist view and the embodied view. 
 On the inferentialist view, the “phenomenal quality could be explained in terms of the idea 
that experience-based judgments are based on an inferential process that is not available to 
consciousness, and hence the outcome of that process has the phenomenal quality of a direct, 
self-evident intuition” (Koriat 2007: 314, our emphasis; see also Koriat 2007: 297-298 and 
 
21 See for instance Whittlesea (1997: 220). Some go as far as saying that one and the same cue can trigger feelings 
with contrary contents depending on the task context. For instance, fluency could trigger a feeling of familiarity 
as well as a feeling of novelty (Unkelbach 2006). But see Olds and Westermann (2012) for a critical discussion of 
these results. 
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1993: 611).22 On Koriat’s view, the feeling nature of an epistemic feeling consists in the 
intuitive character of a certain metacognitive judgment. More precisely, the cognitive system 
is so wired that the detection of a certain cue in a certain context triggers an inferential 
operation. For instance, access to part of the answer to a question (e.g., the first letter of the 
name of a capital city) triggers an inference to the conclusion that the subject knows the 
answer as a whole (the full name of the city). It plays the role of a premise, the other being 
something like: “If part of the answer can be accessed, so can the whole answer”. But since 
this inferential process is subpersonal, as the conclusion of the inference occurs it is both 
endowed with the assertive strength provided by the inference from which it ensues and 
appears to the subject as having its assertive strength in and of itself, i.e., as a gut feeling, 
rather than as the output of an inference, which is what it actually is. Hence the feeling quality 
of the FOK would consist of this apparent gut feeling, and so it would go for epistemic feelings 
in general. There are a number of reasons in favour of the inferentialist view. It 
accommodates the fact that epistemic feelings come with varying degrees of intensity. If the 
detected cue is weak (for instance, only a small part of the answer is accessed), the conclusion 
of the inference will have a correspondingly weak level of assertiveness, e.g., one will feel a 
weak FOK. More importantly, inferentialism smoothly accommodates an important feature 
of the FOP. As one episodically remembers, one does not, strictly speaking, have a FOP that 
accompanies the remembered scene as if the former were juxtaposed to the latter23. Instead, 
the scene itself appears as a scene experienced in the past. In other words, pastness appears 
as one of the features of the represented scene, not as a separate mental state that co-occurs 
with the first-order memory. Thus, an attribution of pastness to the represented scene must 
occur at some point. Inferentialism gives us just that with the predication carried out by the 
conclusion that results from the inference.24 As the inference concludes, pastness appears as 
intrinsic to the remembered scene. 
 On the (James-inspired) embodied view, the feeling quality does not consist of the 
apparent intuitiveness of a metacognitive judgment, but of the bodily nature of the vehicle 
of its content. “On this model, noetic feelings are first and foremost bodily experiences, i.e. 
experiences about bodily states. They are diffuse affective states registering internal 
physiological conditions and events” (Dokic 2012: 307, our emphasis).25 For instance, as far 
as the FOP is concerned, the bodily event of a high level of fluency of processing brings about 
a feeling. This account would seem to encounter two difficulties, but both can be met. First, 
assigning a bodily content to the FOP might seem problematic. Indeed, as already noticed, if 
it is made salient to a subject that her feeling of pastness is due to a felt perceptual fluency, 
the bodily condition does not play the role of a metacognitive cue anymore and the FOP fades 
away. But we said above, drawing on empirical evidence, that a bodily feeling can change its 
content without ceasing to be a feeling. Depending on the context of its processing, one and 
the same bodily feeling vehicle can have different contents26. The conscious character of the 
bodily feeling is thus unproblematic provided it does not imply the conscious experience of a 
 
22 The claim that the feelings that result from the metacognitive monitoring are derived through an inference is 
widespread in the empirical literature on feeling-based metacognition (Jacoby et al. 1989; Koriat 2000; 
Whittlesea 1993, 1997; Kunilla and Westerman 2011). 
23 See above and below our criticism of Dokic’s account on this point. 
24 Note that, just after the passage quoted above, Koriat insists on the “nice convergence” there is between his 
feeling-based metacognitive view and the attributionalist view promoted by Jacoby and Kelley (1991). The same 
claim is made in Koriat (1993: 611). 
25 See Damasio (1999) and Prinz (2004) for prominent advocates of this view. 
26 See our discussion of Dokic’s account on this point in 4.2. 
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bodily condition as its content. Second, if one considers Dokic’s (2012) associationist version 
of the embodied view, one does not clearly see why, as we argued in section 4, the bodily 
feeling appears as a feature of the represented scene rather than as a merely accompanying 
feeling. In other words, the embodied view has to explain why pastness is a phenomenological 
feature of the content of the first-order memory, rather than merely a juxtaposed mental 
state. Let us say at this stage that we endorse the embodied view and grant that the feeling 
quality of epistemic feelings is bodily.27 But we also think that inferentialism says something 
true. On the inferentialist version of the embodied view we promote, the felt bodily change 
(e.g., a high level of fluency) triggers the inference whose outcome is the attribution of a 
feature (e.g., pastness) to the represented object (e.g., the scene represented by the first-
order memory). As we said above, this is just what the phenomenology of episodic memories 
presents us with. Moreover, inference can also explain how the bodily feeling gets its 
metacognitive content in place of its original bodily content. It is the inference process that 
interprets the detected bodily change as meaning, for example, pastness. Overall, 
inferentialism turns out to be the good way of fleshing out the embodied view rather an 
opposite view. 
 
5.3 The content of the FOP: Moderate conceptualism 
 
The last issue we tackle is the content of the FOP. We said that the FOP carries informational 
content about the scene represented by the first-order memory, and we have made it explicit 
in section 3.2 which components are typically included in that content. This point raises 
several interesting though rarely tackled issues. In particular, is the content of the FOP non-
conceptual, as its nature of feeling suggest? Or is it conceptual? If so, to what extent? 
Moreover, provided that the FOP is not only about the past, how do the different (possibly 
conceptual) components of its content relate to each other? Are they compositionally related, 
or are they simply clustered together, and how tightly are they related? For reasons of space, 
we make only some brief suggestions here. 
 Though in the minority, some authors have observed in recent years that epistemic 
feelings are likely to have various degrees of complexity.28 Following up on a suggestion made 
by Arango-Muñoz (2014), we maintain that this complexity is a conceptual complexity of their 
content. For instance, framing effects are observed regarding epistemic feelings (Finn 2008; 
Koriat et al. 2004: 654), which suggests a sensitivity of the latter to concepts and possibly their 
(at least partial) conceptual nature. A more straightforward argument is that the experienced 
content of some epistemic feelings requires involvement of concepts. For instance, it seems 
that a being can hardly feel that she knows or has forgotten something without mastering the 
concepts of knowledge and forgetting and the basic theory of mind in which they have sense. 
We also maintain that there is “a gradation among epistemic feelings: from non-conceptual 
to conceptual ones” (Arango-Muñoz, 2014: 199). For instance, the feeling of knowing 
(respectively forgetting or error) should be contrasted with the feeling of certainty (resp. 
uncertainty). While they are all about the (resp. lack of) epistemic robustness of a piece of 
information, these feelings possess different degrees of conceptuality. Arguably, one can 
experience a feeling of certainty without possessing, let alone being conscious of the concept 
of certainty, as the behaviour of an animal or of an infant can display. But as we have said, 
one can hardly experience a feeling of knowing without being conscious of the concept of 
 
27 For a review of some empirical arguments, see Arango-Muñoz 2014. 
28 Dokic (2012: 308) suggests a distinction between basic and non-basic epistemic feelings. 
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knowledge and a fortiori possessing it. A certain enrichment of the human conceptual 
apparatus has to occur to go from the first to the second type of epistemic feelings. Our 
suggestion is that a similar enrichment is required to go beyond feelings of familiarity (FOF) 
and be able to experience the FOP. Note that even amongst researchers who endorse a 
feeling-based approach, some take it for granted that: “a feeling of familiarity is usually 
sufficient to make one feel one is remembering,” (Whittlesea 1993: 1235).29 In line with the 
above suggestion, we argue instead that the FOP involves more conceptual complexity than 
the FOF. We said in section 2 that “pastness” is an umbrella term that covers various notions 
as its ingredients, namely: 
• singular temporal addresses taking place in a unilinear, continuous, and irreversible 
time and endowed with a perspectival character (i.e., each address is a temporal 
position from which the whole line of time can be considered);  
• the subjective character of the mentioned time (i.e., it is the temporal path of the 
existence of a subject, which requires the notion of a self as correspondingly 
temporally extended); 
• a causal continuity (i.e., the before/after relation characteristic of the notion of time 
involved in the phenomenology of episodic recollection is a causal relation)30. 
By contrast, the FOF does not involve many of the just mentioned ingredients. In particular, 
neither unilinearity, nor irreversibility and perspectivality are required, and accordingly, the 
notion of an extended self it involves is much simpler than the one involved in the FOP. 
 How should one endorse this conceptualist analysis, though? Taken without qualification, 
it is hardly tenable. Regarding epistemic feelings in general, if they could carry contents of 
whatever conceptual complexity, then the distinction between meta-representational and 
feeling-based metacognition would threat to crash down. The latter would differ from the 
former only by the type of vehicles of contents while its conceptual sophistication would be 
the same. But how could type-1 processes go fast and be intuitive if they involve conceptually 
rich contents? Regarding the FOP in particular, if all the mentioned conceptual ingredients 
were included into its content, there would be a serious threat of conceptual overload. All in 
all, so goes the objection, one should prefer an alternative view to conceptualism. For 
instance, inspired by Russell (2003: 151), one could suggest that the conceptual ingredients 
mentioned above are ingredients of a re-description of the feelings experienced during 
episodic recollection, not ingredients constitutive of their content. We think, yet, that there 
is an empirically well-grounded solution that preserves conceptualism under a moderate 
version that stirs a middle way between constitutive conceptualism and a re-descriptivist anti-
conceptualist view. 
 Constitutive conceptualism assumes there is just one way for a concept to be a component 
of the content of a mental state, namely: by being part and parcel of it. But as developmental 
psychology suggests, cognitive reality is more complex. During the ontogenetic development 
of a cognitive system, certain concepts can be the causal conditions of the content of others 
without being included into them. According to Hoerl and McCormack, the concept of 
pastness involved in episodic recollection entertains just such a relation with the notions of 
self and causality (2001, 2007, 2011). Regarding the notion of self, the claim is that the 
perspectival and singularity-endowed notion of time proper to the FOP is developmentally 
dependent on a certain notion of self. For this notion of time to be in place, indeed, 
 
29 Whittlesea also speaks of the “feeling of pastness” (1997: 241). But there is no indication he intends to 
distinguish it from the feeling of familiarity. 
30 Hoerl and McCormack 1999, 2001, 2011; McCormack and Hoerl 2007. 
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beforehand one has to be conscious of oneself as a temporally extended self who occupies a 
certain singular temporal perspective (the current one) among others within a unique series, 
some of which one has occupied and can take again through an imaginative exercise of 
decentering. Perspectivality and singularity features of time would thus be the causal effects 
of the antecedent acquisition of a specific notion of self, while the latter would not itself be a 
component of the notion of pastness (2001: 219).31 Regarding causality, similarly, the claim is 
that the unilinear and continuous notion of time proper to the FOP is developmentally 
dependent on a certain notion of systematic causal relations between the events that form 
the line of time. The acquisition of the ability to reason causally on how events relate to each 
other within time brings about the notion of a time formed of a unilinear continuous 
sequence of experienced events (2011: 454).32 In brief, the notions of self and causality would 
shape the notion of time in play in the FOP. Drawing on this developmental-psychology-
inspired analysis, we suggest a moderate version of conceptualism on which the content of 
the FOP is formed of a concept of past only, but this specific concept is developmentally 
shaped by previously acquired notions of self and causality. This way we assign a moderate 
amount of conceptuality to the content of the FOP, while securing through the shaping 
relation the fact that it has the different components we assigned to it in section 3.233. This 
analysis aligns neatly with our experience of the FOP. As the phrase “feeling of pastness” 
suggests, what is central in the content of the FOP is first and foremost the concept of a past 
temporal location. But if one is prompted to flesh out the content of the FOP, one is likely to 
end up assigning to it a subjective character and causal relations between singular 
experienced events. In our view, this amounts to making it explicit what has developmentally 
brought about the notion of pastness proper to FOP and reflects neatly the different ways the 
components of the content of FOP belong to the latter. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
To sum up, we have made a case for a metacognitive feeling-based account of the 
phenomenology of episodic recollection, which we have designated as a feeling of pastness. 
We have promoted a view that integrates opposite views – most of which had never been 
opposed so far – scattered across the philosophical and psychological literatures. Three 
tenets have turned out pivotal for our account. Firstly, instead of promoting either separatism 
or anti-separatism regarding the relationship of the feeling of pastness to the content of the 
first-order memory that it provides with its phenomenology, we have preferred a view that 
makes due room both to insensitivity to the components of the content of the first-order 
memory and to sensitivity to the mental mnemonic type of its content. Secondly, instead of 
endorsing either an inferentialist or an embodied stand regarding the feeling nature of the 
 
31 “Self-consciousness has a substantive causal role in the emergence of episodic memory rather than being a 
necessary component of episodic recollection” (210). 
32 “We argue that the ability to engage in this form of reasoning is central to possessing the concept of the past 
that is used in episodic memory and that children do not possess this concept until they are capable of engaging 
in this type of reasoning” (2001: 218). 
33 As pointed out by an anonymous referee, an important question here is whether reducing the number of the 
components of the FOP suffices to reduce its conceptual complexity. After all, one could say, the developmental 
shaping relation we invoke can propagate into the FOP the complexity of the components that it does not 
include. Our tentative reply is that for a given set of concepts, it is less demanding to think of just one of them 
rather of the whole conjunction of them, even though the former has been complexified by the latter. As we 
suggest at the beginning of section 5.3, pursuing this point is beyond the scope of the present paper. 
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phenomenology of episodic recollection, we have preferred a view on which subpersonal 
inferences are required for the bodily state of feeling to be attributed to the content of the 
first-order memory. Thirdly, instead of favouring either conceptualism or anti-conceptualism 
regarding the content of the feeling of pastness, we have preferred a view that 
accommodates both the possibility for epistemic feelings to have a conceptual content and 
the requirement of conceptual paucity, thereby explaining why pastness has a central place 
within a content that has several components.  
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